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EXCLUSION OF PLAINTIFFS
FROM THE COURTROOM IN
PERSONAL INJURY
ACTIONS: A MATTER
OF DISCRETION OR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT?
Allen P. Grunes*
Courts facing the issue of exclusion of litigants from civil trials have differed on
the nature of the litigants right to be present, and on whether the exclusion decision
lies primarily within the discretion of the trial or appellate court The author suggests
a two-step analysis for the exclusion decision. Thefirst step recognizes a constitution-
ally protected right to be heard, belonging to the litigant, which limits the trial court's
discretion. This right should be examined in terms of the function that the litigant's
presence at trial would serve in protecting his "due process" rights. If the litigant is
unable to meaningfully participate in the trial then the second step requires an assess-
ment of probable jury prejudice which lies squarely within the discretion of the trial
court
INTRODUCTION
IN THE TYPICAL civil action, the right of a litigant to be present
in the courtroom during trial is unquestioned. If asked to explain
this right, many judges and lawyers would no doubt echo the senti-
ments of an Ohio appellate judge who in 1931 declared that "[t]he
plaintiff below was entitled to be in the courtroom if she so desired;
she being the plaintiff in the case at bar."' Like the Ohio judge, we
* Associate, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, Ohio; Lecturer on Law, University of
Cincinnati College of Law; A.B., Dartmouth College (1979); J.D., Rutgers-Camden School of
Law (1983); LL.M., New York University (1986). The author wishes to thank Professor
William E. Nelson of the New York University Law School for helpful suggestions on an
earlier draft. The author had some involvement with this issue in connection with the consol-
idated trial in the Bendectin multidistrict litigation which took place in Cincinnati during the
early months of 1985. However, the views expressed herein are those of the author and not
those of any other person or entity.
1. East Ohio Gas Co. v. Van Orman, 41 Ohio App. 56, 61, 179 N.E. 147, 149 (1931)
(Defendant argued that it was misconduct by plaintiff's attorney to bring plaintiff into court.
Plaintiff was unable to testify as a result of injuries sustained when her house exploded due to
a gas leak).
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simply tend to assume that parties to an action will be present dur-
ing trial proceedings. If we thought about the issue, we might even
sense that litigants have a right to be present at trial. Few of us,
however, would be able to articulate the nature of that right. Still
less would we be able to think of circumstances in which parties
might be excluded from their own trials.
In recent years, courts have been willing to entertain challenges
to a litigant's presence in the courtroom. Most often this issue has
been raised in personal injury cases in which the plaintiff's mere
presence in the courtroom threatened to result in significant jury
prejudice to the defendant.' Typically these have been cases in
which the plaintiff suffered from grievous and debilitating injuries.
It is in this context that courts have begun to ask whether, and
under what circumstances, plaintiffs may be excluded from their
own trials. At least one court has responded, in dicta, "never." 3
But the trend is clearly the other way. The highest courts of two
states have held that party exclusion is appropriate during the liabil-
ity phase of a bifurcated trial when plaintiffs are in a comatose con-
dition4 or are so severely injured that they are unable to express
themselves and are wholly unable to comprehend trial proceedings.'
The Sixth Circuit has approved exclusion of an autistic minor in a
similar setting.6 Most recently, an Indiana appellate court has
found the trial court's exclusion of a seven year old quadriplegic
child from the liability phase of a trial to be harmless error.7
Courts that have grappled with the exclusion issue in recent
years have uniformly held that litigants should not be excluded
from the courtroom unless they are unable to comprehend trial pro-
ceedings or to assist counsel, and their presence at trial would mate-
rially increase the risk of jury prejudice.' Agreement on the
2. See, e.g., Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985) (exclusion
from liability phase of plaintiff who is unable to understand trial proceedings is harmless
error); Morley v. Superior Court of Ariz., 131 Ariz. 85, 638 P.2d 1331 (1981) (en banc)
(plaintiff in coma should have been excluded from liability but not damages phase of trial);
Gage v. Rozarth, 505 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (exclusion from liability phase of trial
of seven-year-old quadriplegic plaintiff upheld); Dickson v. Bober, 269 Minn. 334, 130
N.W.2d 526 (1964) (plaintiff who is unable to comprehend trial may be excluded to prevent
jury prejudice). See also notes 50-64, 67-91 and accompanying text.
3. Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 A.D.2d 15, 18, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1978) (Trial court's refusal to allow the plaintiff, a paraplegic, to be present during jury
selection was held to be reversible error).
4. See Morley v. Superior Court of Ariz., 131 Ariz. 85, 638 P.2d 1331 (1981) (en banc).
5. See Dickson v. Bober, 269 Minn. 334, 130 N.W.2d 526 (1964).
6. See Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985).
7. Gage v. Bozarth, 505 N.E.2d 64, 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
8. Id.
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appropriate standard has come about because courts have generally
taken a functional approach to the problem: They have viewed ex-
clusion in terms of the purposes served by the litigant's presence in
the courtroom. Courts have moved toward this functional ap-
proach almost intuitively. After all, there is something both intui-
tive and rational about requiring that a litigant's presence serve
some legitimate purpose and not merely serve to prejudice an oppo-
nent. But the same courts that have agreed on the conditions prece-
dent to exclusion have been unable to agree on the more basic
jurisprudential issues which arise in this context. What is the na-
ture of the plaintiff's right to be present at trial? Is it within the
trial court's discretion to order a party excluded? Are there any
constitutional rights involved in such a decision? If so, what are
these rights and to whom do they belong? Does the defendant have
a right to go to trial without the plaintiff being present in appropri-
ate cases?
Unable to articulate which rights are at stake, courts have also
been unable to agree on the extent of such rights. In some measure,
the analytical difficulty is a result of courts coming at the problem
from a variety of perspectives. A court might look at the entire
exclusion problem essentially as a matter of fairness-a matter to be
determined by trial judges on the basis of their supervisory author-
ity over the conduct of the proceedings. From this perspective, a
trial court might be willing to tolerate a certain amount of jury sym-
pathy or disruptiveness generated by a party because the court still
regards the overall proceedings as fair. In some cases, however, the
court could regard the fairness of the proceedings as seriously at
risk. In such cases the court could use its supervisory power to
restore the balance of fairness. This approach, expressly or implic-
itly, recognizes that the trial court is in the best position to insure
that a trial is conducted free from unnecessary bias and disruption.
The focus of this view is on the integrity of the proceedings from the
standpoint of overall fairness. In this view constitutional considera-
tions play little part.
However, other courts could look at the problem from a differ-
ent perspective. These courts, more apt to find constitutional issues,
may wish to preserve the traditional model of a trial, which presup-
poses the presence of a plaintiff, defendant, and counsel. Accord-
ingly, they may find that the right to be present is protected by
constitutional provisions, such as the right to due process. Under a
due process rationale, a litigant ordinarily should not be excluded
without a hearing designed to insure that the litigant's presence in
1988)
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the courtroom would serve no legitimate purpose.9 Not surpris-
ingly, this second approach tends to vest supervisory responsibility
in the appellate court rather than in the trial court; it is intended
more as a check on the trial court's discretion than as a recognition
of that court's discretion.
Still other courts could regard a litigant's presence in the court-
room as an essential part of the jury trial. From this perspective,
the right to trial by jury embraces the intangibles which tradition-
ally have been incidents of the jury trial-intangibles which go be-
yond merely evidentiary matters.
This Article explores some of the jurisprudential questions
which arise in the context of exclusion, and suggests a coherent ap-
proach to the problem. It is the author's contention that a two step
analysis is appropriate where the presence of the plaintiff in the
courtroom may jeopardize the fairness of the proceedings."0 The
first step requires recognition that a litigant has a constitutionally
protected right to be heard. This right derives from the constitu-
tional guarantee of due process. Recognition of this right should
prevent a trial judge from arbitrarily acting to exclude a litigant or
from ordering exclusion without evaluating whether the litigant can
meaningfully participate in the trial. If the litigant is unable to par-
ticipate in the trial proceedings in a meaningful way, the decision
whether or not to exclude the litigant turns on an assessment of
probable jury prejudice. This determination does not involve a con-
stitutional issue and consequently should lie squarely within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge. By recognizing that the exclusion
question has both a constitutional and a discretionary component,
courts should be able to fashion a coherent and consistent approach
to the problem.
I. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF EXCLUSION
If a litigant is entitled to be present in the courtroom during
trial, this entitlement cannot be traced to any express constitutional
provision. Several courts have attempted to relate the plaintiff's
right to be present to a specific constitutional guarantee, such as the
seventh amendment to trial by jury1 or the fifth or fourteenth
9. See infra text accompanying notes 85-88, 94-99.
10. See, e.g., Helminki v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985). Discussed
infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
11. See Carlisle v. County of Nassau, 64 A.D.2d 15, 18, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114, 116 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978).
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amendments' due process clause. 12 These attempts have not been
altogether satisfactory. Assertions of a right based on the seventh
amendment find little or no support in constitutional jurispru-
dence. 13 Due process, on the other hand, is a more likely source of
the right to be present in the courtroom, but without further explo-
ration it is too fluid a concept to be of much use. 14 Without more,
the abstract assertion of due process tells us little or nothing about
the nature of the plaintiff's right or the way in which due process
enters the picture from an analytical standpoint. In addition to the
arguments based on the fifth, seventh or fourteenth amendments,
constitutional or quasi-constitutional arguments have been made,
based on the right of access to the courts, in prisoners' civil rights
cases. 5 Courts have had no trouble rejecting such arguments, how-
ever, and have consistently distinguished the right of access to the
courts from the right to be present in the courtroom.16 Finally, ar-
guments based on particular state statutes have been advanced with
similar effects. 7
While the United States Supreme Court has identified a "right
to be heard" in trial proceedings, 18 the nature and extent of this
right is revealed only upon consideration of a number of cases in
which neither a party nor his counsel was present at possibly crucial
points in the trial. In Hopt v. Utah,'9 decided in 1884, Hopt had
been convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a then terri-
12. See Hehninski, 766 F.2d at 213.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 15-16, 27-33.
14. See, eg., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("It has been said so often
by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."); see also Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) ("[D]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not
a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.").
15. See, eg., Pollard v. White, 738 F.2d 1124, 1125 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1111 (1985).
16. In the context of prisoners' claims under § 1983, courts have held that "[a] pris-
oner's right of access to the courts does not necessarily guarantee him the right to be present
at the trial of his civil suit." Dorsey v. Edge, 819 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing
Pollard). The Dorsey court affirmed the trial judge's requirement that the plaintiff present his
testimony by deposition. Although the court encouraged the Department of Corrections to
authorize the plaintiff's transfer for trial, the court was unwilling to order the Department to
do so.
17. See Preston v. Goldman, 164 Cal. App. 3d 1135, 210 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 42 Cal. 3d 108, 720 P.2d 476, 227 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1986) (Ruling that brain-
damaged quadriplegic child had right to be present in courtroom during liability trial under
California Evidence Code § 777, but holding that exclusion was harmless error in view of
child's inability to understand proceedings or cooperate with counsel).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 19-42.
19. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
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torial Utah court. Because the Supreme Court review was by writ
of error, the Court had power to review the trial proceedings for
errors of law.20 At issue was whether the jurors who were chal-
lenged by the defendant for bias should have been examined in open
court rather than in a secretive fashion in another room. Relying
primarily on a provision in the Utah Criminal Code of Procedure,
which stated that a defendant accused of a felony "must be person-
ally present at the trial," the Court overturned the conviction.2"
Rejecting the argument that the defendant had waived his right
to be present because his counsel had failed to object at the appro-
priate time, the Court held that it was not within the power of the
defendant or his counsel to waive the defendant's right to be pres-
ent.22 This holding derived from a view of punishment set forth in
Blackstone's Commentaries.23 The Court, quoting Blackstone,
wrote that "[t]he great end of punishment is not the expiation or
atonement of the offense committed, but the prevention of future
offenses of the same kind."24 From this deterence principle the
Court found that the interest of the public superseded the interest of
any individual criminal defendant; the legislature having expressed
its determination that the right to appear was essential for the pro-
tection of the accused, this right could not be waived.25
While this reasoning may not be satisfactory to the modern law-
yer, it does illustrate a number of important points. First, the
Court's reasoning stems from notions about the purpose of criminal
law and thus the rule is logically restricted to criminal cases. Sec-
ond, the rule appears to operate only if there has been a legislative
pronouncement. Under the Court's reasoning, the legislature is the
voice of the public and expresses the values which the public deems
to be important in securing the rights of the individual. In marked
contrast to the expansive interpretation of due process which the
Court had begun to develop in contemporaneous civil cases involv-
ing liberty of contract,2 6 the analysis of Hopt reflects a more restric-
tive application of the due process clause to procedural rights. By
20. Id. at 575.
21. Id. at 576-78.
22. Id. at 579.
23. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1783) [hereinafter
COMMENTARIES].
24. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 579 (quoting 4 COMMENTARIES 11).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1897); Frisbie v. United
States, 157 U.S. 160, 165-66 (1895).
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clear implication, if the legislature had been silent, the Court would
not have imposed the rule sua sponte.
In a case decided in 1919, Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co.,27
the Supreme Court was presented with a civil case involving what it
termed "an important question of trial practice."28 At issue was
whether the trial judge erred by responding to a written inquiry
from the jury in the absence of the parties and their counsel. The
Court held:
We entertain no doubt that the orderly conduct of a trial by
jury, essential to the proper protection of the right to be heard,
entitles the parties who attend for the purpose to be present in
person or by counsel at all proceedings from the time the jury is
impaneled until it is discharged after rendering the verdict.29
The Fillippon rule is that a party or his counsel has a right to be
present at all proceedings. The use of the disjunctive word "or"
makes it clear that the Court was not concerned about the rights of
a litigant to be present in the courtroom per se; rather, the concern
was that there be someone present to assert and protect the liti-
gant's interests. This is especially clear given the facts of the case.
The jury had requested that the trial court clarify a point of law. In
essence, the jury wanted to know whether the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law under the facts which
had been presented."0 Had the attorney been present, the Court
reasoned, he could have excepted to the trial court's proposed in-
struction and the trial court could have reconsidered.31
While it is easy to state the rule in Fillippon, it is not as easy to
isolate the rights which the Court felt were at issue. This problem is
compounded because the opinion appears to have both a constitu-
tional and a nonconstitutional dimension.
The Court apparently derived the right to be present from two
sources. First, "the orderly conduct of a trial by jury; '3 2 and sec-
ond, the Court's reference of the "right to be heard."33 The first
phrase has seventh amendment overtones, but also suggests that the
Court was relying on some notion of a trial judge's supervisory re-
sponsibilities over the proceedings. The second right, which seems
to have its roots in due process, was the central theme of the case.
27. 250 U.S. 76 (1919).
28. Id. at 77.
29. Id. at 81.
30. Id. at 80.
31. Id. at 82.
32. Id. at 81.
33. Id.
1988]
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To a jury, a trial judge's words may quite literally have the force of
law. By communicating privately with the jury, the trial judge was
imposing his own view of the law upon the jurors and depriving the
parties of any right to be heard.
Seven years after Fillippon, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in Shields v. United States,34 another case in which a judge had
communicated with the jury in the absence of the parties and coun-
sel. Interestingly, the Court applied only the supervisory responsi-
bility prong of Fillippon.
In Shields, the petitioner was indicted and tried with eight or
nine others for conspiracy to violate the Prohibition Act and for
direct violations of that Act .3  After the case was submitted to the
jury, counsel for the defendants and the prosecuting attorney visited
the trial judge in chambers and requested the jury be held in delib-
eration until they agreed upon a verdict. Sometime thereafter, the
jury sent a note to the judge in chambers saying that they had
reached a verdict with respect to a number of defendants but had
failed to reach a verdict with respect to other defendants, including
the petitioner. The judge sent a note back to the jury room inform-
ing the jurors that they would have to reach a verdict as to all de-
fendants. As a result, the defendant petitioner was convicted of
conspiracy.36
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, relying upon two of
the grounds urged by the petitioner. First, the Court agreed with
the petitioner that the request that the jury be held in deliberation
until they reached a verdict could not be construed as a blanket
consent for the court to communicate with the jury out of court and
in the absence of the defendants and their counsel. 7 Second, the
Court held that the conviction was in conflict with Fillippon. The
Court interpreted the Fillippon decision as announcing a rule de-
rived from a concern for the orderly conduct of a jury trial.3' The
Court refused to pass on a third argument raised by petitioner, who
had urged that the action of the district court in communicating
with the jury was a denial of due process of law.39 Shields thus
demonstrated that the exclusion of parties and counsel may not
amount to a constitutional deprivation.
34. 273 U.S. 583 (1927).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 584-85.
37. Id. at 586-87.
38. Id. at 588-89.
39. Id. at 586, 587.
394 [Vol. 38:387
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The first case of precedential importance expressly to hold that
constitutional due process protects a civil litigant's right to be pres-
ent during all phases of a trial was the Third Circuit's decision in
Arrington v. Robertson.' The facts in that case were virtually iden-
tical to the facts in Fillippon. A jury, in the course of its delibera-
tions, requested additional instructions on a point of law. The trial
judge responded from chambers in the absence of the defendant or
the defendant's counsel. Upon these facts, the Third Circuit could
have issued a memorandum opinion reversing and remanding the
case on the authority of Fillippon. Rather than doing so, however,
the court announced a rule of its own making. Citing Hopt, Fillip-
pon, and Shields, the court held that "[t]he due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution requires that a defendant be
accorded the right to be present in person or by counsel at every
stage of his trial."41 The court said "orderly procedure" required
that Hopt be applicible to civil actions, and emphasized the due pro-
cess underpinnings of Fillippon.42
Taken as a whole, these cases suggest the existence of a constitu-
tional "right to be heard." The right to be heard certainly prohibits
a trial judge from arbitrarily excluding a litigant from the court-
room. Moreover, it reasonably appears to derive from notions of
due process. But what if the litigant is incapable of "speaking?"
What if the plaintiff is comatose or a very young child? In these
instances, the right to be heard can only be satisfied by the presence
of counsel or a guardian; it cannot require the plaintiff to be person-
ally present. Of course, the plaintiff's presence may be necessary to
assist the jury in assessing damages. Here one may say that the
plaintiff does in fact "speak" through his or her mere presence.
However, the right to be heard should not include the right to
prejudice the jury. Indeed, unnecessary jury prejudice may itself
violate due process if it infringes upon the right to a fair trial.43
There may be times when jury prejudice is inevitable; but the right
40. 114 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1940).
41. Id. at 823.
42. Id.
43. In In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), the Supreme Court stated: "A fair trial in
a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of
actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the possibility of unfairness. Id. at 136. See, eg., In re Japanese Electronic Prod. Antitrust
Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[D]ue process precludes trial by jury when a jury
is unable to perform [its] task with a reasonable understanding of the evidence and the legal
rules."). Cf. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970) (holding that the trial court had
discretion to remove a criminal defendant from his own trial after repeated instances of dis-
ruptive conduct by the defendant).
1988]
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to prejudice the jury is not constitutionally protected and trial
courts have traditionally made an effort to minimize the level of
prejudice.
The assessment of jury prejudice calls for an evidentiary deter-
mination. It is therefore a matter which properly lies within the
discretion of the trial court."4 While the power to supervise trial
proceedings is not unlimited; it is vested in the trial court,45 and
reasonably should extend to the decision to exclude a party to a civil
action, permitting the trial court to evaluate the probable prejudice
which would be caused by a plaintiff's presence in the courtroom.
In Cavendish v. Sunoco Service of Greenfield,46 the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the plaintiff's four
year old son from the courtroom even though the child was a poten-
tial beneficiary of the decendent's estate and therefore could have
been regarded as a party in interest.47 The child was playing with a
toy windmill during closing argument; the trial judge, observing the
effect this was having on the jury, ordered the child excluded.48
Plaintiff argued on appeal that the child, being a party, had a right
to be present in the courtroom.49
The Seventh Circuit held that the trial court had discretion to
maintain the dignity of the courtroom and to conduct the trial in an
orderly manner.5" Exclusion was therefore held to be justified. The
court refused to find that any "substantial" or constitutional right
of the plaintiff's son was implicated.5'
Of course, Cavendish was a case involving exclusion because of
disruption and not exclusion because of potential jury prejudice. At
a minimum, however, the decision illustrates that a trial judge must
have some measure of control over the courtroom and also that the
trial judge is in the best position to make a determination on mat-
ters which may affect the jury's performance of its duties.52
II. THE EMERGENCE OF A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
A litigant's presence at trial may serve a number of important
44. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 183 (1981) (the obligation to
impanel an impartial jury lies in the first instance with the trial judge).
45. Id.
46. 451 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 1368.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
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functions. The litigant's presence may assist counsel in at least two
ways. First, the litigant generally has superior knowledge of the
facts underlying the dispute and may be in a position to educate
counsel, both before and during trial. This is the litigant's "educa-
tive" role. 3 Second, the litigant may be able to assist counsel in
formulating trial strategy. This is the litigant's "strategic" role.54
Additionally, the litigant's presence may have a moral effect on op-
posing witnesses and serve as a deterrent to untruthful statements.
This is the litigant's "moral" role." The presence of a litigant may
also be directly relevant to evidentiary questions such as the liti-
gant's actual condition and the extent of his or her injuries. This is
the litigant's "evidentiary" role." Finally, one may speak of the
litigant's "proprietary" role in that the litigant is in some sense the
owner of the dispute,57 as well as the litigant's "public" role in that
the litigant has an interest shared with the public at large in being
able to observe the proceedings. 8
The first case to view the question of exclusion in essentially
functional terms was Dickson v. Bober. 9 Dickson was also the first
case in which a court recognized the relationship between func-
tional analysis and the availability of bifurcating the trial into liabil-
ity and damages segments under that state's equivalent to Rule
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6"
53. See Anderson v. Snyder, 91 Conn. 404, 408, 99 A. 1032, 1034 (1917).
54. See Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208, 214 (6th Cir. 1985); Carlisle v.
County of Nassau, 64 A.D.2d 15, 18, 408 N.Y.S. 114, 117 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (Right of a
party not only to be an interested and concerned observer of a proceeding which ultimately
affects him, but to help plan and plot the trial strategy is in no way denigrated by the presence
of retained or assigned counsel).
55. See Anderson, 91 Conn. at 408, 99 A. at 1034.
56. See Morley v. Superior Court of Ariz., 131 Ariz. 85, 88, 638 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1981)
(en bane) (plaintiff should have been allowed into court to show condition as evidence of
damages); Talcott v. Holl, 224 So. 2d 420, 421-22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (no error in
permitting plaintiff to be brought into courtroom on stretcher).
57. The rule that a suit must be maintained by the real party in interest (the plaintiff
must have a personal stake in the outcome) is suggestive of this proprietary role.
58. See United States ex rel Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199, 203-05 (D.NJ.
1971) (Sixth amendment right to public trial is for benefit of accused "that the public may see
he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested specta-
tors may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and the importance of
their functions." (quoting I COOLEY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (8th ed. 1927))). Cf
Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947) ("What transpires in the courtroom is public
property.").
59. 269 Minn. 334, 130 N.W.2d 526 (1964).
60. Id. at 338 n.3, 130 N.W.2d at 530 n.3. The Minnesota rule provided that "[tihe
court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice.... may order a separate trial of
any claim." See 48 MINN. STAT. § 4202 (1979). This language parallels that of FED. R. Civ.
P. 42(b).
1988]
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The plaintiff in Dickson was a minor who was severely injured
when the motorcycle he was riding collided with an automobile. As
the Minnesota Supreme Court remarked, "[t]he accident changed
Allan Dickson from a vital, intelligent, healthy youth to one unable
to sustain himself, helpless and entirely dependent on others, and
wholly unable to comprehend trial proceedings."61 Thus the plain-
tiff was unable to perform any of the functions which might justify
his presence in court during the liability phase of the trial. The trial
judge had observed the plaintiff before ordering that he be excluded
from the courtroom. This was a "trial test" and it left the judge
with little doubt as to the impact which the plaintiff's presence
would have on the jury.6"
The state's highest court affirmed the order of exclusion, holding
that a plaintiff who is unable by reason of his injuries to contribute
to or understand the trial proceedings could be excluded from the
courtroom in order to preserve an atmosphere of fairness.63 The
court made reference in a footnote to the possibility of bifurcating
the proceedings in order to allow plaintiffs to be present during the
damages phase, when their appearance would be relevant as evi-
dence of their injuries.' Rejecting a constitutional challenge to the
order of exclusion, the court held that the plaintiff's due process
rights were satisfied by the presence of counsel and a guardian ad
litem during the trial proceedings. Due process did not require that
the plaintiff be present in the courtroom.65
The Dickson opinion is noteworthy precisely because of the
functional approach taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court. By
examining the issue with an eye toward the functions which a liti-
gant's presence serves at trial, the court was able to draw a distinc-
tion between litigants who could participate in the proceedings in
some meaningful manner and those whose injuries made them un-
able to do so. Once this distinction was articulated, the court was
able to reject a concept of due process which was essentially ab-
stract and without content.
The court's suggestion that a trial court should examine the ex-
clusion issue in terms of the overall fairness of the proceedings re-
flects an awareness that the exclusion issue requires the trial court
to engage in a balancing operation. How much prejudice is likely to
61. Dickson, 269 Minn. at 336, 130 N.W.2d at 529.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 337-38, 342, 130 N.W.2d at 530, 533.
64. Id. at 338 n.3, 130 N.W.2d at 530 n.3.
65. Id. at 337 n.2, 130 N.W.2d at 530 n.2.
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result if the plaintiff is present in the courtroom throughout the
trial? What harm will result to the plaintiff's case if exclusion is
ordered? The court held that these are determinations which lie
within the particular competence of a trial judge, reviewable by
higher courts for abuse of discretion.66
Morley v. Superior Court of Arizona67 followed the Dickson ap-
proach and was even more explicit in recognizing the trial court's
responsibility to strike a balance between the competing considera-
tions which enter into a decision about exclusion. Morley involved
claims for personal injuries sustained by a plaintiff who was left in a
coma following an automobile accident.6" In a series of pretrial rul-
ings the trial court had severed the liability and damages issues pur-
suant to Rule 42(b) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure and
had ordered the plaintiff excluded from the trial of both issues.69
The Arizona Supreme Court noted that the trial court's rulings "re-
flect[ed] a concern for the prejudicial impact Paul Morley's appear-
ance would have on the jury."7 The court then affirmed the
decision to bifurcate the trial but held that the plaintiff should not
have been preemptorily excluded from the damages trial.71 The
Morley opinion comes close to holding that it would have been an
abuse of discretion if the trial court had allowed the plaintiff to be
present during the liability phase; however, the opinion notes that
the balance was different during the damages phase because the
plaintiff's own physical condition was the most direct evidence
available on the extent of his damages, 72 and supports the use of a
functional analysis.
Perhaps because it followed the Dickson opinion in all material
respects, Morley does not even pay lip service to the plaintiff's due
process interests. In fact, the only constitutional concern which the
66. Id. at 337, 130 N.W.2d at 530.
67. 131 Ariz. 85, 638 P.2d 1331 (1981) (en bane).
68. Id. at 86, 638 P.2d at 1332. ("This vegetative state, which will probably last the
remainder of his life, requires a tracheostomy for him to breathe, and he is fed from a tube
inserted in his stomach.").
69. Id. The Arizona rule 42 is the same as the Minnesota rule and the federal rule. See
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. R. CIv. P. 42(b); supra note 60.
70. Id. at 86-87, 638 P.2d at 1332-33.
71. Id. at 86-87, 638 P.2d at 1333, 1334. The court noted that even during the damages
trial the plaintiff's right to appear was not absolute. The plaintiff could "waive his right to be
present" if his presence became "disruptive to the conduct of the trial." Id. at 88 n.1, 638
P.2d at 1334 n.l. Under these circumstances, his right to appear could be limited to "the
brief period when his presence is necessary to show his injuries to the jury." Id.
72. Id. at 87, 638 P.2d at 1334. "The plaintiff should be allowed to prove damages by
the most direct evidence available-the plaintiffs own physical condition."
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Morley opinion did address was the defendant's right to an unbiased
jury.7
3
A feature of the Dickson-Morley approach which deserves some
discussion is the link between the severity of the plaintiff's condi-
tion and the appropriateness of exclusion. An objection on policy
grounds may be raised at this point. The argument may be made
that the defendant reaps an unfair benefit at trial if the plaintiff has
been seriously injured. After all, the more serious the injury the
more likely it is that the plaintiff will be unable to comprehend the
proceedings or to assist counsel. Construing the exclusion of the
plaintiff as a benefit to the defendant, however, merely begs the
question: If the defendant's conduct was innocent, the exclusion of
the plaintiff will not be a "benefit" to the defendant. Rather, it will
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial. After all, the more seri-
ous the plaintiff's injury, the greater too is the likelihood of jury
prejudice. Since the law does not erect a presumption in favor of
liability in civil actions, the defendant is not impermissibly benefited
by a requirement that the plaintiff prove his or her case in a setting
as free as possible from prejudice. Of course, as a practical matter a
plaintiff may have a harder time linking a defendant's conduct to
the plaintiff's injury when the plaintiff is not present in the court-
room. One reason for this added burden, however, is that the plain-
tiff is prevented from relying on jury prejudice as a link in the
liability chain.
A second objection is that exclusion in effect punishes plaintiffs
for their mere appearance. In part, this objection focuses on the
fact that courts are more likely to exclude a plaintiff whose physical
condition is pitiable rather than one whose appearance is "normal,"
since a disfigured plaintiff is more likely to inspire jury sympathy.
On point, a series of Florida cases have held that physical appear-
ance is not a basis for excluding a plaintiff from the courtroom.
74
Arguments based on appearance tend to treat the factor of jury
73. Id.
74. See Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 397 (Fla. 1952) (Defend-
ant not denied right to fair trial although trial court allowed plaintiff into courtroom on
stretcher, since "[o]ne who institutes an action is entitled to be present when it is tried.");
Freeman v. Rubin, 318 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) ("[E]ven though [plaintiff]
was represented by a guardian, we hold that in the absence of a showing that he was so
incapacitated that he could not comprehend trial proceedings, the trial judge erred in exclud-
ing [plaintiff's] physical presence from the courtroom."); Purvis v. Inter-County Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 203 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (Plaintiff could not be excluded
from trial of his case, even though he was "argumentative, somewhat irrational and of such
mental attitude and physical appearance that the jury might be influenced.").
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sympathy as if it were the exclusive criterion for exclusion. These
arguments ignore the necessary assessment of a litigant's mental
condition (or maturity) as a condition precedent. Under the Dick-
son-Morley approach a court must look at both factors. Once it has
been determined that a litigant is unable to comprehend the pro-
ceedings or to assist counsel, the court must determine the likeli-
hood of prejudice by evaluating the jury's probable reaction to the
presence of the plaintiff in the courtroom. This is not a task foreign
to trial judges; Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
the same sort of evaluation.75
In Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories,76 the Sixth Circuit adhered
to the same basic standard as in Dickson and Morley but there was a
shift in emphasis. Helminski was a drug product liability action in
which it was alleged that the minor plaintiff's severe developmental
disabilities were a result of his mother's exposure to the defendant's
product while she was pregnant with the plaintiff.77 Prior to trial,
plaintiff's counsel had agreed to present the plaintiff to the jury by
means of a videotape which had been prepared for that purpose.78
Despite this arrangement, plaintiff's counsel during trial announced
his intention to call the plaintiff as a witness.79 In response to the
defendant's objection, the trial judge ordered the proceedings bifur-
cated into separate trials on the liability and damages issues, and
ordered the plaintiff excluded from the liability phase.80
After affirming the trial court's decision to bifurcate the pro-
ceedings even though the trial was already underway,"1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the exclu-
sion issue. Contrary to Dickson and Morley, the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined that the plaintiff's right to be present in person during trial
proceedings was protected by the due process clause of the fifth
75. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
76. 766 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 210. The severity of plaintiff's disabilities is illustrated by the following pas-
sage in the opinion: "Eventually, physicians determined that Hugh was autistic. As a result
of this condition, Hugh requires 24-hour a day care; he does not speak, is not toilet trained,
and has an extremely low I.Q. Hugh's arrested neurological development is permanent and
irreversible." Id.
78. Id. at 211.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 212.
81. Id. ("The late bifurcation of a trial does not constitute reversible error in the absence
of a showing of prejudice.").
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amendment.8 2 The court summarily rejected the argument that due
process was satisfied when the plaintiff was represented by counsel
and a guardian, holding that an attorney is merely the representa-
tive or agent of the litigant and not the litigant's "alter ego." '8 3
The court's review of existing authority led it to conclude that
due process generally required that a litigant be allowed to be pres-
ent unless the litigant was unable to comprehend the proceedings or
to assist counsel.8 4 In effect, the Sixth Circuit thereby constitution-
alized the rule announced in Dickson and Morley. But the court
went one step further: It held that due process also applied to the
trial court's determination of likely jury prejudice.8 5 Consistent
with its due process rationale, the court held that a hearing would
be required before a litigant could be excluded. At the hearing, the
party seeking exclusion had the burden of showing that the oppos-
ing party's physical and mental condition would prejudice the jury
if he or she were allowed to be present in the courtroom. 6 The
court defined prejudice in this context rather stringently: Would
the presence of the litigant prevent or impair the jury from perform-
ing its duties in accordance with its instructions and its oath?8 7 If
this showing was made, the trial judge could order an involuntary
exclusion of the litigant.88
The Sixth Circuit noted that in Dickson, the trial court had ob-
served the plaintiff before ordering that he be excluded from the
courtroom, but the Helminski trial court based its decision to ex-
clude the plaintiff on the basis of the uncontradicted testimony of
his mother and brother.8 9 The trial judge apparently did not ob-
serve the plaintiff first hand, and certainly did not conduct a hearing
of the type the Sixth Circuit felt was appropriate.9" Hence, it could
be argued that due process was not a major issue in Dickson but
became so in Helminski. However, in the Morley opinion there is
no indication that the trial judge held a full hearing or observed the
plaintiff before ordering his exclusion. Faced with abundant evi-
82. Id. at 213 ("[A] court may not exclude arbitrarily a party who desires to be present
merely because he is represented by counsel; such exclusion would violate the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.").
83. Id. at 213.
84. Id. at 216.
85. Id. at 217.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 218.
90. Id. (The decision to exclude the plaintiff can be made only upon observation by the
court).
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dence about the plaintiff's condition, it is doubtful that the trial
court in Helminski would have gained any appreciable insight after
a hearing. Indeed, it is arguable that only if the plaintiff's counsel
contends that the plaintiff's condition is not sufficiently grave to
warrant exclusion should such a hearing be held.
Apparently convinced that a hearing would not have changed
the trial judge's mind on the exclusion question, the Sixth Circuit
held that no reversible error had been committed by the trial
court.9 In light of the opinion's repeated reference to due process,
this seems a rather strange result. It suggests that the right to a
hearing in which the judge can observe the plaintiff's condition is
not an absolute one, and does not extend to cases in which the trial
court is fully aware of the inability of the plaintiff to meaningfully
participate in the proceedings. It also suggests that a judge may
make a factual determination about the probability of jury prejudice
based upon uncontradicted testimony or other information without
the need to actually observe the plaintiff.
In Gage v. Bozarth,92 an intermediate appellate court in Indiana
adopted Helminski in ruling upon an interlocutory appeal challeng-
ing an order of exclusion. The plaintiff was severely injured at the
age of three when he was hit by an automobile. He was seven years
old at the time of trial, a quadriplegic, and dependent on a ventila-
tor in order to breathe.93
After successfully moving to bifurcate the trial, the defendants
moved to exclude the child from the liability phase. The court held
a hearing at which the defendants presented evidence of the risk of
prejudice, and evidence that the child's presence in the courtroom
was not needed to aid the presentation of his case.94 The trial court
granted the motion to exclude.
In affirming the ruling, the appellate court reviewed much of the
case law regarding plaintiff exclusion from other jurisdictions, in-
cluding Helminski.9 The appellate court then turned to a number
of principles of Indiana law which it regarded as well-settled.
Among those principles were the trial court's discretion to control
trial proceedings so as to keep the jury from being misled into an
improper verdict,96 the duty of the trial court to protect both par-
91. Id.
92. 505 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
93. Id. at 65.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 67.
96. Id. (citing Huntington v. Hamilton, 118 Ind. App. 88, 97, 73 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind.
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ties' rights to due process,9 7 and the duty of the trial court to scru-
pulously guard the right to trial by jury established in the state
Constitution.98 In light of these principles, the court went on to
reject a challenge to the exclusion order based on the state Constitu-
tion's right to trial by jury, noting that that constitution "guaran-
tees the plaintiff in a civil proceeding a right to a fair and impartial
jury, but it does not guarantee that plaintiff a right to a sympathetic
jury."" The court also rejected a challenge based on equal
protection.100
There is one rather strange twist to the Gage decision which
raises a question as to whether the court was really following
Helminski or was only purporting to do so. In a footnote the court
of appeals noted that the trial judge did not observe the child at the
exclusion hearing. Rather, evidence was presented of widespread
media coverage in which the child was depicted sympathetically. 01
The child's deposition was read, in which he stated that he did not
know the difference between the truth and a lie and that he could
not remember the accident.102 Ultimately, then, the Gage decision
appears to turn on the child's age and incompetence as a witness
rather than just on the standards articulated in Helminski.
It is precisely because neither Dickson, Morley, Ilelminski, nor
Gage fully explores the nature of the rights involved in party exclu-
sions that these decisions remain less than satisfactory from a juris-
prudential standpoint. Dickson and Morley focus on the risk of jury
prejudice; their primary concern is to protect the defendant's right
to an unbiased jury. By contrast, Helminski treats the entire analy-
sis as a matter of the plaintiff's due process rights. The correct ap-
proach lies somewhere in between.
As we have seen, due process considerations enter the picture on
two levels. First, included within the notion of due process is the
Ct. App. 1947) (Judge must not let the jury "be confused or led into the consideration of false
or sham issue, that could not be the basis of a legitimate verdict.")).
97. Id. (citing Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales v. Dickerhoff, 136 Ind. App. 258, 261,
199 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 1964) (Trial court has duty "to see that fundamental
rights of due process are not improperly denied.")).
98. Id. (citing Kettner v. Jay, 107 Ind. App. 643, 645, 26 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. Ct. App.
1940) (Court must scrupulously guard the right of trial by jury)).
99. Id. at 67-68.
100. Id. at 68. The court also noted that "[t]he presence of counsel for the plaintiff and
the opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of his claim keeps a plaintiff's
right to a jury trial meaningful, while the inclusion of an injured plaintiff unable to assist
counsel or understand the proceedings adds nothing to that right." Id.
101. Id. at 69 & n.l.
102. Id. at 69.
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right to be heard or participate. This right protects a plaintiff from
arbitrary exclusion. Second, due process includes the right to an
unbiased jury. This right permits the trial judge to order exclusion
in certain circumstances.
Analytically, the trial judge should determine whether the plain-
tiff is meaningfully able to contribute to or comprehend trial pro-
ceedings. Once this determination has been made, the trial court
must evaluate the likely prejudice which the plaintiff's presence
would have on the jury. This second determination is a matter
which falls within the discretion of the trial judge and generally
does not present a constitutional issue.
In some cases, such as those which involve comatose or severely
retarded plaintiffs, the determination of the plaintiff's capabilities is
relatively easy. In other cases the determination may be more diffi-
cult. The trial judge should make an inquiry sufficient to be satis-
fied that the plaintiff cannot meaningfully contribute to the trial
proceedings. Some sort of hearing should ordinarily be held.
Whether the party must be present at the hearing will necessarily
depend upon the circumstances of the case. Due process is intended
to protect against the erroneous deprivation of a right"0 3 and if the
trial court has any residual doubts about whether the correct deter-
mination has been made, it is probably a good idea to make video
and telephone connections available to the excluded party."° Of
course, if the trial judge has sufficient confidence that the plaintiff
can comprehend the proceedings or assist counsel, exclusion is
probably not proper.
The assessment of likely jury prejudice is within the particular
competence of the trial judge and is not properly viewed as a consti-
tutional issue. To regard it otherwise, as the Sixth Circuit appears
to do in Helminski, is to extend the notion of due process beyond its
proper scope. The major error of the Helminski approach is the
court's conclusion that due process reaches the determination of the
likelihood of jury prejudice as well as the determination of whether
the plaintiff can contribute to the proceedings. By making the cal-
culation of jury prejudice a constitutional standard, the court of ap-
103. See, eg., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1978) ("Procedural due process
rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjusti-
fied deprivation, of life, liberty or property.").
104. This was the approach taken by Chief Judge Carl B. Rubin in a consolidated trial
involving the drug Bendectin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982). See In re Richardson-
Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Products Liability Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 1212, 1224 n.9 (S.D.
Ohio 1985) (plaintiffs' appeal pending).
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peals intrudes on what should be the sphere of the trial court. The
trial court is best equipped to determine what effect the plaintiff's
appearance will have on the jury. In this regard, it may be instruc-
tive to consider the treatment which so-called "Day in the Life"
films have received.
"Day in the Life" films are intended to provide some of the de-
tails of a plaintiff's daily life so that the jury may more completely
assess the extent of the plaintiff's injuries.010 These films have be-
come a mainstay of personal injury cases in which the plaintiff is
confined to a wheelchair or a bed. A film may show the activities of
a "typical" day in the plaintiff's life or may show a specific activity,
such as a physical therapy session.'0 6 The chief advantage of "Day
in the Life" films is their ability to dramatically impress upon the
jury the reality of a plaintiff's medical condition. The dangers of
such films are, first, that they provide a golden opportunity to elicit
jury sympathy, and second, that they are highly resistant to effective
cross-examination. 107
The admission of "Day in the Life" films is committed to the
sound discretion of the court,10 8 and courts generally rely on Rule
403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence or its equivalent if they decide
to exclude such films.1 09 The same type of analysis appears to be
appropriate to the determination of whether a plaintiff's presence in
the courtroom during the liability phase would unduly prejudice the
defendant. The balancing called for by Rule 403 is a discretionary
function of the trial court. The rule recognizes the trial judge's abil-
ity to make a judgment call about the relative risk of prejudice or
other factors extraneous to proper adjudication. Similarly, the as-
sessment of the risk of prejudice should be analyzed in the same
manner in the exclusion context. It should fall squarely within the
discretion of the trial court.
105. See generally Preiser & Hoffman, "Day-in-the-Life" Films-Coming of Age in the
Courtroom, TRIAL, Aug. 1981, at 26.
106. See Note, Beyond Words: The Evidentiary Status of "Day in the Life" Film, 66
B.u.L. REV. 133 (1986).
107. Id. at 135 nn. 16-17. The author argues that "day in the life" films present a hearsay
danger which is concealed by the medium of expression. See id. at text accompanying notes
117-121.
108. See Bolstridge v. Central Maine Power Co., 621 F. Supp. 1202, 1203 (D. Me. 1985).
(Videotape held not admissible, since plaintiff could "demonstrate to the jury in open court
activities similar to those depicted in the videotape.").
109. See id. at 1204; see also Thomas v. C.G. Tate Construction Co., 465 F. Supp. 566,
569-71 (D.S.C. 1979) (Court held that since both doctor who performed physical therapy on
plaintiff and plaintiff himself were available to testify at trial, the tape's "probative value is
substanially outweighed and over-shadowed by the danger of unfair prejudice.").
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III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recently taken an overtly functional ap-
proach to the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment in a case
involving a criminal defendant's exclusion from a competency hear-
ing involving two minor children. 1 I In that case, the Court identi-
fied the "function" of the confrontation clause as the protection of
the right of cross-examination and found that the opportunity ex-
isted for meaningful cross-examination at trial notwithstanding the
defendant's exclusion from the preliminary hearing. The Court's
willingness to adopt a functional approach to the confrontation
clause in a criminal case involving a question of exclusion is possi-
bly significant to the future development of the law involving the
question of exclusion in civil cases. It is hoped a similar approach
will be taken in such cases.
This Article has advocated the recognition of a "right to be
heard" derived from the constitutional guarantee of due process. It
has argued that the right to be heard is the basis for a litigant's
entitlement to be present in the courtroom. It has also argued that
the right to be heard should be examined in terms of the functions
which a litigant's presence in the courtroom serves. Viewed in these
terms, a two-step analysis is appropriate in cases involving the ques-.
tion of exclusion. The first step involves assessment of the constitu-
tional right; the second step involves the exercise of discretion. This
two step approach satisfactorily accommodates the rights of both
defendant and plaintiff.
110. Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2662-64 (1987) (Right to cross-examine is
"essentially a 'functional' right designed to promote reliability in the truth-finding functions
of a criminal trial.").
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